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1. Introduction
Korea has been transformed from a closed, low-income agricultural economy in 
the 1960s to a high-income open diversified, and growing economy. Korea is no 
longer poor or closed economically. The Korean economy is linked to the world 
economy which is rapidly progressing skills- and knowledge-based technological 
change. Korean society has become freer and more democratic. 
Korea used to be a small poor closed agriculture-based economy. Per capita GDP 
value  was only $121 by 1962. In 2007 it had reached $20,220 per person. Thus it 
has experienced miraculous growth over a short four decades. This paper attempts 
to describe how Korea shifted from its poor agricultural base to the advanced 
industrial economy, followed by the presentation of per capita GDP, production and 
employment structure, education, and total factor productivity growth. We ask what 
factors lay behind Korea’s economic success. In addition, this paper addresses the 
appropriate economic policy for Korea in a high-tech skill world and the likely 
challenges that Korea will need to confront in the 21st century.
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2. Policy Focuses under Different Regimes
Numerous books and articles have been reported on the subject of the development 
of the Korean economy.1) This section does not provide the full documentary details 
of the development process of the Korean economy and it does not spell out the 
fiscal and monetary policy measures implemented in details.2) It does not directly 
discuss the history of Five Years Plans of Economic Development.3) It does offer 
characteristics of phases under different regimes through which the Korean economy 
have transformed during the last fifty years, 1962-2007.
We divide the past fifty years into four different regimes named for  the President 
that contributed to the transformation of the Korean economy. We list the four 
different regimes with the main characteristics as follows: a. 1962-79 Regime of 
President Park, Chung Hee, Big Push; b. 1980-92 Regime of President Chun, Doo 
Hwan, and Rho, Tae Woo, De-Regulation and Trade Liberalization; c. 1993-97 Regime 
of President Kim, Young Sam, Financial Liberalization and OECD; d. 1998-2007 
Regime of President Kim, Dae Jung, and Rho, Moo Hyun, Opening and 
Globalization.4)
We argue that Regime of President Park, Chung Hee initiated the development of 
the economy and determined the course of Korean economic and social development 
in the latter years. The succeeding Regimes of President Chun, Doo Hwan, and Rho, 
Tae Woo, President Kim, Young Sam and President Kim, Dae Jung, and Rho, Moo 
Hyun contributed the Korean economy to become an open and global economy 
though opening of trade and capital markets.
 1) For the professionals and public who are interested in the Korean economy, books listed below 
supply different points of views and analysis by policymakers and professional analysis: Cha, 
Dong-Se, Kwang Suk, Kim, Dwight H. Perkins, ed, (1997), Cho, Soon, (1994), Hong, Wontack, 
(1994), Kim, Chung-yum, (1994), Korean Federation of Industries, ed, (1986), Kwack, Sung 
Yeung, ed, (1993), Kwack, Sung Yeung, (1990), and Nam, D. W., (1997).
 2) For chronological collection of the policy implemented in Korea, see Korea Development Institute 
(1995). For a fuller and detailed description of major fiscal and monetary policies, see Koh, Young 
Sun (2008). For a chronology and major implemented monetary policy measures, see the Bank 
of Korea (2000) and Kim, Kyung Soo and Lee, Jaewoo (2010).
 3) Economic Planning Board (1982, part 3, pp. 358-393), Korean Federation of Industries, ed, (1986, 
part 1, pp. 26-120) and Kang, Kwang Ha (2000).
 4) This division is made largely on the basis that individual Presidents implemented policies to reflect 
their main goals. Similar periods are utilized by Kim, Kyung Soo and Lee, Jaewoo (2010) and 
Koh, Young Sun (2008).
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2.a 1962-79 Regime of President Park, Chung Hee,  Big Push5)
Prior to 1960, Korea was still a small closed agriculture-based economy. Per capita 
GDP was only $121 by 1962.6) Serious hunger and employment problems led to 
public despair, leading to anarchy as the civilian government lost direction and the 
capacity to improve conditions. In the midst of the national crisis, General Park 
Chung Hee took power through a military coup in 1961. His goal was to rescue the 
national economy and to ensure national security. His immediate goal was to bring 
Korea out of poverty, anger, and hopelessness. 
The Korean economy came to play the central role in the nation’s reconstruction. 
When the government launched its first five-year development plan in 1962, Korea 
for the first time in its history emerged onto the world economy. The new government 
initiated a program called the Saemaul Movement (New Village Movement) to 
reconstruct rural areas, playing a major role, for example, in providing dams for flood 
protection, in reforesting denuded hills and mountains, and in procuring heavy 
earth-moving machinery to irrigate, grade, improve, and bring new lands under 
cultivation or consolidate dispersed holdings.7) The government also built access roads 
and brought electrical power to villages that had never had them before. Farmers 
were provided with tractors to replace the old cow-drawn plow and canals were built 
to supply drought afflicted areas. Very little corruption was seen, and the entire nation 
people felt enthusiastically supported and took great pride in the national effort.
In 1965, the government relaxed the control of the financial system. In 1972, the 
government took an emergency measure which included a moratorium on loan in the 
informal market. It launched the third five-year development plan, the aim of which 
was to develop in order to strengthen the national defense and make Korea’s 
industries more technology-intensive. The class of businessmen and those in technical 
profession were belong to the less respected classes in the society. Industries were 
not well equipped with expertise with knowledge of specialty while the government 
had recruited a large number of well educated and practical experts. It mobilized 
capable groups of larger scale firms, which were called as Chaebol group, to run the 
heavy and chemical industry. The government provided technical and financial 
 5) This part draws on Chapter 7, section 1 of Kwack and Lee (2010, pp. 685-687). The period 
of this phase includes the First, Second, and Third Five-Years Plans of Economic Development.
 6) See Cho (1994) and Nam (1994).
 7) See Kim (1994) and Park (2006).
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resources.8) Government policy-makers and personnel provided direction and guidance 
to the firms selected. The low interest rate policy and government subsidy to 
investments had the effect of encouraging a capital-intensive method of production. 
The heavy and chemical industry is an industry with the economies of scale. Korea’s 
own market is small and thus, the foreign market determines the course of the 
industrial development. As a result, outward-looking export-promotion strategies with 
big Chaebol groups became central to the government’s development plan.9) The 
development plan also brought the expansion of government-supported research 
institutes to supply the needed technical guidance and the expansion of education 
programs to supply the needed manpower and skills. The government plans under 
the Park’s regime established the course of Korean economic and social development 
in the latter years.
2.b 1980-92 Regime of President Chun, Doo Hwan, and Rho, Tae Woo, 
De-Regulation and Trade Liberalization10)
In 1977, Korea attained its exports of $10 billion. In the latter part of 1970s, 
particularly from 1977, the economy experienced excess demand and a speculative 
boom in real estate including housing and apartments. The government focused on 
price stability by implementing a tight fiscal policy. Owing to three lows-low oil price, 
low interest rates and low Korean won, the current account was in a surplus. Trade 
openness was expanded and imports were flexibly permitted. Government activated 
market functioning, opening of the economy and began to privatize banks and 
liberalize interest rates in the early 1980. Still bank interest rates and banks were under 
administrative control of the government.
2.c 1993-97 Regime of President Kim, Young Sam, Financial Liberalization and 
OECD
Interest rates were liberalized in the 1990s. International capital flows were freed 
up gradually and the ceiling on short-term foreign currency borrowings by banks was 
lifted in 1994. Korea applied for an OECD membership on March 1995 and became 
 8) See Oh (2006), and Stern, Kim, Perkins, and Yoo (1995, chapters 1-3, 1-61).
 9) See Scitovsky (1986) for the comparison between Korea and Taiwan.
10) In this period, the Fourth and Fifth Five-Years Plans of Economic Development were carried 
out.
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a member of OECD on December 1996. Korea met the conditions for OECD 
member with regard to financial and monetary markets. Financial liberalization and 
international capital liberalization allowed borrowers to take excessive risk and led to 
weaknesses in the balance sheet of financial institutions as well as big business 
corporations. The capital flow liberalization concluded with a financial crisis.11)
2.d 1998-2007 Regime of President Kim, Dae Jung, and Rho, Moo Hyun, 
Opening and Globalization
Continuous growth and globalization are accompanied by a worsening distribution 
of income and rising wage earning inequality. This regime tried to prevent the 
distribution of income from worsening. President Kim recovered the Korean economy 
from the financial crisis. As a result, the role of the private sector in the economy 
became greater and the Korean economy turned into a more globalized economy. 
President Rho proposed Korea-US Free Trade Agreement.
3. Main Causes for Korean Economic Success and Miracle12)
Most economists  and analytics agree in attributing Korea’s remarkably rapid growth 
to the nation’s rapid export growth. While economic growth is the ultimate target 
of policies to be attained by the implementations of policies, the export growth is 
considered as intermediate policy targets rather than a policy tool. There is a view 
that government interventionist or industrial policies are a powerful basis for growth 
if prices are set right.13) Industrial policies in Korea established a favorable 
environment for investment.14) 
What factors lay behind Korea’s economic success? There were many.15) We identify 
four which we consider the most important. First, the world economic environment 
and free trade facilitated Korean trade. The United States was engaged in the cold 
war with the Soviet Union and was eager to assist friendly developing countries in 
Asia. New technologies were made readily available to Asia including Korea.16) Korea 
11) Bhagwati (2004) is a well-known advocate for free trade, but opposed the opening of international 
short-term capital markets.
12) This part utilizes Chapter 7, section 1 of Kwack and Lee (2010, pp. 687-689).
13) See Amsden (1989).
14) See Rodrik (1994).
15) See Hong (1994, pp. 3-24).
16) On January 2, 1959, the Soviet Lumik 1 spacecraft breaks free of Earth’s gravitational pull. The 
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under the President Park Chung Hee seized the opportunity. Korea benefited from 
the advantages of being a latecomer. But, Korea was not a later comer in the world, 
as many countries failed to take the opportunity.
Secondly, President Park Chung Hee mobilized Korea’s resources for national 
reconstruction. His pushed for Seoul-Pusan Express Highway and Pohang Iron & 
Steel Company,  two notable examples of his initiative and determination. Park Chung 
Hee wrote that “I had to break, once and for all, the vicious cycle of poverty and 
economic stagnation.” The leadership inspired the government bureaucrats and 
Korean people to come together in making Korea a nation without ‘hunger’.17) 
Schuman (2009) emphasizes the role of his leadership in the economic miracle in 
Korea.18)
Thirdly, Koreans enthusiastically desired to attain greater education levels and 
practical skills. The government, therefore, implemented the expansion of educational 
institutions including the university system. The increased stock of human capital and 
skills satisfied the demand for expanded labor input. 
Fourth, the government implemented policies to open the economy. Korea 
undertook imitating to catch up to the technology level of the leaders. As a follower 
in early 1960, Korea utilized its imports of capital goods and intermediate materials 
from technologically advanced countries to build up its production capability. The 
efficient use of imported technology in the improvement and modification in product 
design was made possible by Korean workers who attained a high education level. 
As its technological capabilities rose, Korea increased investment in R&D activities 
and human resource development and lowered its trade barriers to generate 
innovations and to acquire new technologies.19) 
flight of the Lumit set off the breakdown of barriers in space, and  speed. According to Kaplan 
(2009), “1959 was the year when the shockwaves of the new ripped the seams of daily life, when 
humanity stepped into cosmos and also commandeered the conception of human life, when the 
world shrank but the knowledge needed to thrive in it expanded exponentially, when outsiders 
became insiders...-when the world as we know now it began to take form.”
17) See Kim (1994) for the discussion of non-economic factors. The deriving force is made by 
‘han’-unsatisfied desire or deep rooted grudge.
18) See Schuman (2009, chapter two). He describes in details the miracle of individual countries in 
Asia including Korea. In Introduction, he discusses the question of what really caused the Asian 
economic miracle. He emphasizes the role of Asia’s leaders who made the hard, but correct, 
choices in favor of globalization. The Asia’s leaders are Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, Chiang 
Kai-shek in Taiwan, Park Chung Hee of South Korea, Deng Xiaoping in China, Manmohan  
Singh in India and Mahathir in Malaysia.
Historical Transformation and Prospects of the Korean Economy 31
4. Main Transformation Indicators
4.1 Per capita GDP in US dollar
Over Korea’s modern period, the per capita GDP of Korea has grown rapidly. The 
average value of per capital GDP in U.S. dollar is $949 during the 1962-1979, up 
to $4627 during the period 1980-1992. (see Table 1). The average value of per capita 
GDP is $9803 in 1993-1997 and rises to $15620 during the 2000-2007. The growth 
rate of Korean GDP value per person is higher than the growth rate of foreign GDP 
value per person.  
<Table 1> Nominal Value of GDP in U.S. Dollar per Person
Period Average Value
1962~1979   949
1980~1992  4627
1993~1997  9803
1998~1999  8605
2000~2007 15620
Bank of Korea, National Accounts.
IMF, WEO Macro-Database.
<Table 2> The Composition of Manufacturing Industry Value Added by Light and 
Heavy and Chemical Industries
Year Total (billion)
Light Industry 
(%)
Heavy  and Chemical Industry
(%)
1970 17.8 59.4 40.6
1975 21.6 50.4 49.6
1980 24.4 41.9 58.1
1985 27.3 36.3 63.7
1990 27.3   29   71
1995 27.6 23.4 76.6
2000 29.4 20.7 79.3
2005 28.4 15.3 84.7
2007 27.9 14.1 85.9
Bank of Korea, http//ecos.bok.or.kr.
19) There are numerous studies on the process of catch up by Korea. Among them, are  the study 
by Pack and Westpal (1986), Nelson and Pack (1999), and Timmer (2003).
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4.2 Production and Employment Structure
The share of output in heavy and chemical manufacturing increased from 40.6 
percent of total manufacturing output in 1970 to 85.9 percent in 2007. (see Table 
2). 
<Table 3> Composition of Real GDP by Industry
Period GDP AgricultureMining Mfg EGW Construction Service
1962~79  87153.9 19.7 14.7 0.7  8.6 56.3
1980~92 255165.5  9.6 21.9 1.7 11.0 55.9
1993~97 458625.3  6.3 24.2 2.2 11.7 55.6
1998~2007 642620.3  4.6 30.3 2.7  8.8 53.7
The figure of industry is a percent of real GDP in 2000 billion won.
EGW is electricity, gas, and water supply. 
Mfg is manufacturing.
<Table 4> Composition of Total Manufacturing Real GDP by Sub-Industry
Period Total FTWF PNMM MEP TE
  1962~79  12839.0 59.2 28.1  8.6  4.1
  1980~92  55772.2 40.4 36.6 14.7  8.3
  1993~97 110992.9 27.6 39.5 21.2 11.7
  1998~2007 194597.5 15.3 32.3 41.0 11.4
The figure of sub-industry is a percent of total manufacturing GDP.
FTWF refers to foods, beverages, textiles, wood, pulps, and furniture.
PNMM refers to petroleum, chemicals, non-metal and metal products.
MEP refers to machine, electrical equipment, and precision instruments.
TE refers to transport equipment.
The Korean structure of production has shifted from agriculture and mining to 
manufacturing. The share of manufacturing in real GDP was 14.7 percent during 
1962-1979 and reached 30.3 percent during the period of 2000-2007. (see Table 3). 
The manufacturing sector shifted toward skills-bias and knowledge intensive 
sub-sectors. The share of machines and equipment manufacturing in GDP  to total 
manufacturing output rose from 36.7 percent in the period of 1962-1979 to 73.3 
percent in the period of 1998-2007. (see Table 4). The trends of employment indicate 
that Korea’s production shifted from the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
mining and quarrying) to the service sector. As shown in Table 5, employment in 
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agriculture and mining was 59 percent of total employment in 1966 and decreased 
to 9 percent in 2007. In contrast, employment in manufacturing and construction 
(secondary sector) increased from 12 percent in 1966 to 27 percent in 2007. Strikingly, 
the share of employment in the service sector rose from 29 percent in 1966 to 64 
percent in 2007.
<Table 5> Trends of Employment by Three Broad Sectors
Year 1966 1990 2007
   All Industries 8618 15889 18784
   Primary sector 50950.59
2960
0.19
1766
0.09
   Secondary sector 10280.12
5556
0.35
5024
0.27
   Tertiary sector 24950.29
7373
0.46
11994
0.64
Employment figures are in thousand. 
The figure under the employment figure is a fraction of the total employment in the year.
<Table 6> Trends of Educational Distribution ( in fraction)
  All Industries Primary Secondary Tertiary
1966      
Primary and below 0.71 0.74 0.69 0.67
Middle School 0.18 0.21 0.09 0.15
High School 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.11
Jr. College 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03
University and above 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.04
  
1990      
Primary and below 0.29 0.50 0.27 0.23
Middle School 0.21 0.36 0.19 0.17
High School 0.38 0.13 0.44 0.43
Jr. College 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.06
University and above 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.12
  
2007      
Primary and below 0.13 0.41 0.11 0.09
Middle School 0.11 0.35 0.09 0.08
High School 0.41 0.18 0.50 0.41
Jr. College 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.13
University and above 0.24 0.03 0.20 0.29
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4.3 Educational Composition of Employed Labor 
Table 6 shows the trends of the distribution of workers by educational attainment 
in Korea. About 74 percent of the workers of the primary sector in 1966 attended 
no more than primary school, falling to 50 percent of workers in 1990 and 41 percent 
in 2007. In the secondary sector, about 69 percent of workers in 1966 attended the 
primary school and below, about 27 percent in 1990 and about 11 percent in 2007. 
The educational level of workers in the tertiary sector has been rising rapidly. Primary 
school graduates among workers have declined from 67 percent in 1966 to 9 percent 
in 2007. The share of the workers that graduated from jr. college and higher school 
was steadily increasing. The workers who graduated from college and higher are the 
second largest group in employment. 
4.4 Growth of Total Factor Productivity(TFP)
TFP growth may be affected by R&D investment and technological catch-up efforts. 
Korea promoted R&D investment and foreign technology borrowings in the middle 
of 1980. Thus, TFP growth is expected to show an upward trend. Using the standard 
neo-classical growth accounting framework, the growth in GDP can be decomposed 
into two factor inputs and TFP.20) The growth rate of aggregate GDP is a weighted 
average of growth rates of GDP by industries, and the weights are relative GDP value 
shares. Table7 shows the results of decomposition in the growth in the economy-wide 
output. Capital stock is the main source of the economic growth The contribution 
by the capital stock to economic growth has been high, but at a declining rate: 75% 
in 1961-1970, 76%in 1971-1984, 61% in 1985-1996, and 46% in 2001-2007. The 
capital contribution declined. The contribution of labor hours has declined in the 
1961-2007 period: 24% in 1961-1970, 23%in 1971-1984, 17% in 1985-1996, and 18% 
in 2001-2007. The rate of TFP contribution to GDP growth has increased 
considerably in recent years: 1% in 1961-1970, 2%in 1971-1984, 22% in 1985-1996, 
and 36% in 2001-2007. The TFP contribution rate rose in the period 2001-2007. 
Korean GDP growth in 2000s was greatly attributed to Korean TFP growth.21)
20) Data sources and detailed discussion are given in Chapter 5 of Kwack and Lee (2010, pp. 
594-644).
21) The TFP estimate  differs from the available estimates given notably by Pyo Hak Gil.
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<Table 7> Capital Stock, Labor Hours, and TFP Quantity Growth
 
Average Growth Rates of:
GDP Capitalstock
Labor   
hours
TFP
quantity
1961~1970
(ratio to GDP)
9.80
 
7.37
0.75
2.36
0.24
0.07
0.01
1971~1984
(ratio to GDP)
8.16
 
6.18
0.76
1.85
0.23
0.13
0.02
1985~1996
(ratio to GDP)
8.19
 
4.99
0.61
1.39
0.17
1.81
0.22
1997~2000
(ratio to GDP)
3.77
 
2.71
0.72
-0.40
-0.11
1.46
0.39
2001~2007
(ratio to GDP)
4.46
 
2.05
0.46
0.79
0.18
1.62
0.36
The growth rate of GDP is a weighted average of industrial growth rates.
Relative GDP value shares are weights.
TFP quantity refers to TFP measured with capital stock and labor hours worked.
5. Economic Policy in the World of Globalization and Education
Korea’s development framework was the framework of industrial policy to pick 
winners by the government. It was very effective in the early stage of development. 
However, Korea’s strategy for the present and forthcoming stage of modern 
development is to ‘go for higher growth through human capital’. The human capital 
strategy is consistent with on-going skill-biased technological progress. This technology 
makes physical capital and skilled labor complementary to each other and lowers 
demand for less-skilled workers. Hence the key for preventing rising inequality while 
promoting growth is raising the knowledge and skills of all workers. Education, 
research &development, and health are the most effective means to realize human 
capital enhancement.22)
5.1 Misguided View on Education in Korea
Most Koreans believe they are better educated and claim that we are number one 
22) See Botticini and Eckstein, (2005). Jewish comparative advantage in urban, skilled occupations 
and their distinctive academic mark are credited to their widespread literacy prompted by a 
religious and educational reform in Judaism in the first and second centuries CE. Study is the 
only undisputed and shared value upon which all Jews, regardless of affiliation or belief, can agree. 
Knowledge of Torah and Talmud are considered a virtue second to none.
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in the world. On average, the level of Korean education and skills is good enough 
for workforce to work in the production of goods and services. It may be enough 
for professionals to imitate the existing knowledge and technologies. It is not far 
enough for working with or fostering new ideas and innovation of originality in Korea.
5.1.a Quantity in Korean Education
The quantity of education in Korea was limited until the government of Korea 
expanded its education system including enrollment in the 1960s. Thereafter, the 
numbers of graduates in the high school and college rose rapidly. Using the data from  
the Korean survey of population aged 6 years old and above, we computed Korea’s 
educational accomplishment. Prior to 1958, less than 1 percent of the population had 
attended university. It had risen to 5.7 percent in 1985, and to 21.9 percent in 2007. 
The average period-of-schooling was 6.3 years in 1957, 9.3 in 1985, and 11.5 years 
in 2007. While these statistics show significant gain in the levels of educational 
attainment in terms of years of schooling, these data do not take into account the 
quality of education. 
5.1.b Quality in Korean Education
According to IMD (2008), the percent of Koreans age group of 25-34 with college 
and university degrees ranked the 4th among 55 countries. However, Korea’s 
university education-in terms of its quality-ranked the 53th of all. Korea’s skilled labor 
ranked the 43th, compared to 7th rank for the United States, 6th for Japan, 40th for 
China, 12th for Hong Kong, and 8th for Singapore. Although we may question about 
the data the IMD used in its ranking, the report nonetheless clearly indicates that 
there is substantial room for improvement in the quality of education in Korea.
5.2 Improvement in Korean Education
5.2.a Education of Poor Family Children
Human capital or knowledge has accumulated over time and spread from generation 
to generation. Low human capital from a poor family at present will transfer low 
human capital to the next generation. Early childhood education of low income family 
in the home is quite inadequate. In light of inter-generational transfer and poor 
childhood education, the focus is to give the children of low income households 
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access to high quality education and training from the elementary school by providing 
financial support. 
5.2.b Increased Spending on Education by the Government and Large firms
The share of education in household income is high. However, the share of the 
government in education and research is small. Moreover, little support of education 
and research is given by the Chaebol and large firms is surprisingly small, in contrast 
to the contribution of U.S. firms. This is a rather strange in light of the fact that 
Chaebol and large firms depend on the workers educated from the schools and 
universities. In their own interest, the government and large firms should raise their 
spending for education and research and development. 
5.2.c Pay more to Teachers
Schools need to pay teachers more to attract the better-trained and dedicated 
professions in schools from primary schools to university level. The government 
should reform Korea’s current incentive system to a system that provides pay 
incentives for faculty in research university institutions to devote on in-depth teaching 
and doing research.
6. Issues and Problems Ahead
6.a Korea’s competitiveness
In recent years, there has been foreign competition to supply the main products 
exported by the Chaebol like cars, consumer electronics, machinery, ships, iron, and 
steel. The main characteristics of Korea’s main exports are: (a) The technology in 
their production is general, rather than specific or specialized. Hence, the cost of 
production is highly sensitive to the cost of the labor input; (b) The profit margin 
on consumer electronics has been rapidly lower. China and India have started to 
produce cheap small cars, and China has been constructing big shipyards and steel 
plants. Korea will face a rough road in sustaining its export growth.
 
6.b Diminishing Job opportunity 
In the early 1970s, “Made in Korea” indicated that the products were made by 
Korean workers using Korean technology and raw materials. The export of “Made 
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in Korea” products led to growth in output and employment in Korea. However, 
from the 1990s, the big Korean firms started operating as multinationals. They started 
to import intermediate products and components from abroad and to assemble them 
to make “Made-in-Korea” products. Because of this rising use of foreign-made 
intermediate products and components, the exports of “Made-in-Korea” products do 
not contribute to the growth in output and employment as much as they did.  
According to the Input-Output tables constructed by the Bank of Korea, the total 
employment effect per unit the exports of one billion won at the price of 2005 was 
24 persons in 1995, 10.8 persons in 2005, and 9.4 persons in 2007.
In view of the importance of employment for both economic and social stability, 
the focus of economic policy needs to be on ways to increase employment. The 
government should create incentives for the young to undertake new innovative 
projects and should supply tax credit/subsidy for the employment of young college 
graduates. The government provides financial assistance and tax credit to modernize 
neighbor-friendly traditional local markets. Stores in local markets provide lower prices 
of goods and labor-intensive stores, providing employment opportunities. 
6.c Widening Gap in Income and Wage Earnings
Using the data from 1965 to 2007, we computed the two measures of the 
distribution of gross income, the Gini coefficient and the ratio of top X group to 
bottom I group.23) The Gini coefficient rose from 0.28 during the period 1965-1969 
to 0.28 in the mid-1990s and to 0.31 in the 2000s. The X/I decile dispersion ratio 
for income was 7 in the 1990-97 period. After the financial crisis, it rose to 8.9 in 
2006-2007. As the Korean production structure has shifted to a skill-intensive 
structure, a rise in the demand for output by the openness and capital stock leads 
to widening income and wage inequality. A rise in labor force skills prevents wage 
inequality from widening between the skilled and unskilled. Hence, the policy to 
increase the supply of skill is necessary for the improvement in the distribution of 
income as well as for the economic growth. 
6.d Discrimination in pay between regular and temporary workers. 
There are labor as well as political issues in Korea between regular workers and 
23) This part is based on Kwack (2010) and Chapter 6 of Kwack and Lee (2010, pp. 645-683), an 
extension of the study of Katz, L., and Murphy, K. (1992).
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temporary or irregular workers. As of March 2010, the number of regular employee 
out of the total employees is 8.333 million, about 51.2 percent of the total.24) The 
irregular employee numbered 8.282 million. The hourly wage rate of regular employee 
is 14372 won and the hourly rate of irregular employee is 6826 won, about 48 percent 
of regular employee’s rate. In addition, most of irregular employees do not receive 
health and retirement benefits regular employees entitled. In the world of internet, 
the flexibility of working hours and conditions of workers is needed to take care of 
households need such as child care. But, regular and irregular workers should receive 
an equal pay for the equal work. This is not the case in Korea. Hence, Korea must 
find a way to ensure the equal treatment.
6.e Openness within Korea
The openness to trade of a country can be measured in terms of either quantity 
or price, using the dual character. The standard measure of the openness in terms 
of quantity is the ratio of export volume to real GDP or the ratio of the sum of 
export and import volume to real GDP. The openness of Korea is very high by this 
measurement. The alternative measurement of openness is the comparison of prices 
of goods at home and abroad. It is very difficult to compare the price levels between 
two countries, as example, the level of price of an aggregate good in Korea with 
the level of its prices in the United States. Farm products are relatively homogenous, 
and the prices of farm products in Seoul, Korea and Washington, USA are readily 
available. A unit of Chinese cabbage in Seoul is about $5, whereas the unit of Chinese 
cabbage in a Korean supermarket in Maryland is $0.6, about 12 percent of the prices 
in Korea. The price of one apple is $1 in Seoul, whereas the price of one apple in 
Maryland is $0.7. A necktie of a well known brand in Macy store in Maryland is 
$40, whereas its price in ‘Apgujungdon’ Hyundai store in Seoul is $150. The price 
information may be not precise. Nevertheless, these indicate that the price level of 
most goods in Korea is much higher than in the United States and that the gains 
from trade are not broadly shared by Korean consumers. Korea’s government should 
take measures to import more consumer goods so that working people in Korea will 
share in the gains from trade.
24) The data are from Kim, Yoo Sun (2010),”Status of Irregular workers”, 2010-07, Korea Labour 
& Society Institute, Seoul, Korea; http://klsi.org.
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